Naval War College Review
Volume 70
Number 2 Spring

Article 3

2017

Planning for the Kamikazes - Toward a Theory and
Practice of Repeated Operational Games
John T. Hanley, Jr.

Follow this and additional works at: https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review
Recommended Citation
Hanley, Jr., John T. (2017) "Planning for the Kamikazes - Toward a Theory and Practice of Repeated Operational Games," Naval War
College Review: Vol. 70 : No. 2 , Article 3.
Available at: https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol70/iss2/3

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Naval War College Review by an authorized editor of U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
repository.inquiries@usnwc.edu.

Hanley, Jr.: Planning for the Kamikazes - Toward a Theory and Practice of Repe

PL ANNING FOR THE K AMIK AZES
Toward a Theory and Practice of Repeated Operational Games
John T. Hanley Jr.

O

perational gaming, which includes war gaming, in this context means a
simulation that does not involve actual operations, one in which the flow of
events affects and is affected by decisions made during the course of those events
by players representing the roles of those involved in shaping the outcomes.1 In
1957, operations analyst Clayton Thomas wrote that “there is no body of theory
that sanctions the common use of operational gaming to seek a solution of a game
through repeated plays.”2 Little in operational gaming has changed since then.
The purpose of this article is to suggest possible
John T. Hanley Jr. earned a doctorate in operaapproaches to, and the value of, repeated operations research and management science at Yale
tional gaming, either by one institution repeating
University, writing his dissertation on war gaming.
A former USN nuclear submarine officer and fleet games or by accumulating data from games played
exercise analyst who employed military modeling to
anytime, anywhere to explore what is essentially
conduct campaign analyses, he used gaming extensively during his service with the first eighteen Chief the same contingency.
of Naval Operations Strategic Studies Groups as an
Fleet Admiral Chester Nimitz in 1960 stated:
analyst, program director, and deputy director. He
“[T]he war with Japan had been re-enacted in
also served as special assistant to the Commander in
Chief, U.S. Forces Pacific, in the Office of the Sec- the game rooms here [at the Naval War College]
retary of Defense (Offices of Force Transformation; by so many people and in so many different ways
Acquisition, Technology and Logistics; and Stratthat nothing that happened during the war was a
egy), and as deputy director of the Joint Advanced
Warfighting Program at the Institute for Defense surprise—absolutely nothing except the kamikaze
Analyses. After serving as director for strategy at the
tactics towards the end of the war; we had not
Office of the Director of National Intelligence, he revisualized those.”3 Although this is an overstatetired from government in 2012 and is now an independent consultant.
ment, it is true that repeated operational games, at
the tactical and strategic levels, did allow Nimitz
© 2017 by John T. Hanley Jr.
Naval War College Review, Spring 2017, Vol. 70, No. 2
to understand developments as they happened and
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to adjust his strategy for fighting in the Pacific.4 By the start of World War II, 99
percent of all USN flag officers were graduates of the College.5
This article proposes that repeated operational gaming provides an unparalleled technique for predicting factors governing battles and campaigns and
anticipating actions that would be reasonable for adversaries and allies / security
partners to take, thus eliminating most surprises, thereby better informing operational planning, force allocation, and force development.
Since 2003, the Naval War College has been conducting “Halsey” games with
its students, similar to the way it was done at the College from shortly after 1887,
when William McCarty Little introduced war gaming there, until World War II.6
An analysis of the Halsey games, using some elements of game theory, suggests
promising ways to learn from repeated gaming.
This article addresses a version of the questions that George H. Heilmeier, a
highly respected director of the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency
(1975–77), posed when he was determining whether to approve a new project.
WHAT ARE WE TRYING TO DO?
We are trying to understand the factors governing emergent developments in
the real world through mastering the complexity created by the interaction of
sentient actors—represented by role players, umpires, and game control—whose
behavior, with an admixture of luck and the randomness of nature, affects what
happens. More specifically, we are trying to develop understandings of how U.S.
courses of action (COAs) would interact with those of both allies / security partners and potential or actual adversaries to achieve U.S. security aims.
Specific cases include anticipating the strategies that potential adversaries
such as the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA), Russian military and paramilitary forces, Iranian Revolutionary Guards and military forces, and Islamic
militants would use against U.S. forces in combat, so as to develop appropriate
capabilities to deter and, if necessary, defeat them.7 Armed conflict in the future
also will involve a greater admixture of cyber and movements comprising small
groups and individuals that can wreak havoc with terror and weapons of mass
destruction at a level that only states could accomplish in the past. Over the past
decade, Intelligence Community (IC) Title 50 authorities have become a larger
component of operations that are still dominated by Department of Defense
(DoD) Title 10 authorities in U.S. counterterrorism efforts. Improvements in our
ability to identify and track “persons of interest” through advances in sources
of information, including biometrics, and the processing of “big data” portend
an expansion of “shadow wars” beyond counterterrorism as the United States
extends these new tools to missions such as counterproliferation, counterintelligence, and long-term competition with potential state adversaries. Going beyond
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol70/iss2/3
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the war-gaming techniques of the period between the world wars, we are trying
to anticipate future equivalents to the kamikazes.
This effort involves two major objectives. The first is to understand the logic of
the competition under study to identify governing factors and anticipate how the
key players may act. The second is to create a common vision and commitment
to action among relevant policy makers and commanders. Gaming is a powerful
method for simultaneously mastering complexity, enhancing communication,
stimulating creativity, and contributing to consensus and a commitment to
action.8
HOW IS THIS DONE AT PRESENT?
The major militaries of the world have used war gaming for over two centuries to
simulate the logic of combat. Before the development of operations research (OR)
in World War II, war gaming and field exercises were the primary techniques
military organizations employed to create the synthetic experience of war. While
using operational gaming to predict the outcomes of engagements is exceedingly
problematic, given the number of factors not under the control of the participants, war gaming has a history of predicting accurately the factors governing
battles and campaigns that actually emerged during subsequent operations.9 War
gaming was a continuing activity at places such as the Naval War College and
within German and Japanese military commands, by which participants studied
operational challenges during the years between the world wars.
Following World War II, computer-based combat and campaign simulation
largely replaced war gaming within the Pentagon, although the earlier practice
continued in military colleges and operational commands. Repeated operational
gaming within DoD is rare today. Although many institutions within DoD game
elements of the same contingencies, these institutions and their supporting contractors have few incentives to share game details and outcomes.10
As noted, the role of war gaming in military decision making diminished significantly from the World War II era with DoD’s adoption of OR’s cousin, systems
analysis. DoD largely turned to computerized combat and campaign simulations
for operational, force, and procurement program planning. The models used in
these simulations are direct descendants of those developed during World War
II. When computerized combat simulations are used for operational planning,
the forces and systems available are generally fixed, and alternative operational
courses of action are explored; when these simulations are used for systems
analysis, the operational concepts are fixed, and alternative systems are explored.
This process does not capture the coevolution of technology and operational concepts as well as operations, gaming, and field exercises did in the past. Furthermore, when using computer simulation, it is the analyst developing the models
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and analyzing the results who derives the experience rather than those directly
involved in making policy or military decisions. In contrast, games provide decision makers themselves with direct experience in working through anticipated
contingencies.
Recently, DoD leadership has directed a reinvigoration of war gaming.11 The
vast majority of games that DoD elements conduct explore a “wicked problem”
for a day to a week to gain some insights. Characteristics of a wicked problem
include that the problem is not understood until after the formulation of a solution, and that the solution uncovers other problems to be resolved.12 These games
explore essentially one course of action, which is principally a function of the
scenario and the participants in that game.
In 2003, the Naval War College initiated the Halsey series of games to provide
students with in-depth experience in developing campaigns against potential opponents they might face when occupying more-senior positions later in their careers.13 Some of these games have used a two-sided “metagame” approach for examining alternative Red (i.e., opponent) objectives. This approach gives one side
foresight of the other side’s strategic concept for conducting its campaign, and
then turns the tables iteratively until neither side can do better.14 Once neither
side can gain by changing its strategy—known in game theory as a “Nash equilibrium”—the games move on to examine a different Red objective and campaign
approach. This is a valuable technique that explores a broader strategy space than
single games and leads to interesting equilibriums that suggest what would be
reasonable behavior for the various traditional and nontraditional forces involved
in the fight. However, the number of games a Halsey team can play is limited. The
program began playing one game per trimester, which evolved to one iteration
per year to allow detailed exploration of tactical and logistical details. The Halsey
approach is unique to the Naval War College.15
Few gamers know or appreciate game theory and how it should inform their
gaming efforts. John von Neumann initiated game theory in 1928 as a rigorous
approach to games such as poker and to economic and sociological problems that
“involv[e] . . . questions of parallel or opposite interest, perfect and imperfect information, free rational decision or chance influences.”16 In 1944, along with Oskar Morgenstern, he published these concepts in Theory of Games and Economic
Behavior. Although the mathematics is relatively simple, game theory is arcane,
requiring detailed study to apply, and has few military practitioners. The comprehensiveness of the concepts, the focus on game-theoretic “solutions,” and the
application to economic behavior based on Homo economicus rather than deontic
logic have deterred gamers from studying game theory, and thus the perceived
value of applying game theory to gaming has been limited.17
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Although several papers in the 1950s and ’60s were published applying game
theory to military topics, finding instances where game-theoretic analyses have
influenced military decisions is rare, particularly recently.18 Whereas war games
are rich (complex) in detail, the vast majority of game-theoretic results come
from toy models that strip away context important to actual decision makers.
“For some games, game theory will suggest a ‘solution’ to the game, that is a best
way of playing the game for each person involved; but for most games describing
real problems all it can do is rule out some types of decision and perhaps suggest
which players will [have incentives] to work together.”19 Careful application of
game theory can illuminate structural details underlying operational gaming that
assist in the formulation of strategy.
The core of OR techniques involves mathematical programming for optimization using deterministic models, stochastic models incorporating probabilities, and statistics for estimating expectations.20 None of these techniques
accommodate complex adaptive systems, such as human decision and learning.
Approaches for dealing with complexity to understand the logic of the underlying phenomena, enabled by advances in computer simulation and biological
rather than statistical and mechanical paradigms, are relatively new. Techniques
such as genetic algorithms employing fitness landscapes, cellular automata, and
agent-based models for understanding self-organization and emergence of new
phenomena have blossomed over the past three decades, but as yet are on the
margins of DoD and IC analysis.21 Entities such as the Santa Fe Institute and the
New England Complex Systems Institute have formed to bring together scholars
from a wide range of disciplines and educate a new generation of analysts in these
techniques.
Commercial gaming technology has advanced. Outside DoD, computerized
games have become a ten-billion-dollar industry, with 67 percent of U.S. households playing video games for an average of eight hours per week.22 An even
larger fraction of the population in countries such as the Republic of Korea enjoys
computer games. Within DoD, the Naval Postgraduate School and its sponsors
have pursued efforts such as the Army Game Project for familiarization and recruiting and the Massive Multiplayer Online Wargame Leveraging the Internet
(known as MMOWGLI) to foster innovation through crowdsourcing. The Navy
originally developed a game for training and tactical development that became
Harpoon Advanced Naval Warfare. Jane’s Combat Simulations / Electronic Arts
teamed with companies that do simulation and training for DoD to produce
games such as 688-I and Fleet Command. These games contain high-quality data
for expected systems performance. The PLA recently developed similar games
to promote public interest and recruitment. However, a wide gulf exists between
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the commercial and military gaming communities, with the former incentivized
by the entertainment value of the game and the latter emphasizing the validity of
combat models.23
WHAT IS NEW AND WHY MIGHT IT BE SUCCESSFUL?
In a sense, this article’s central proposal is far from new. A century ago, Rear
Admiral Bradley A. Fiske recommended a similar approach in The Navy as a
Fighting Machine:
By this scheme, a body of officers at the Navy Department would occupy their time
wholly in studying war problems by devising and playing strategical and tactical
games ashore and afloat. After each problem had been solved to the satisfaction of
the staff, each distinctive situation in the approved solution would be photographed
in as small a space as practicable, preferably on a moving-picture film. In the solution
of problem 99, for instance, there might be 50 situations and therefore 50 photographs. These photographs, shown in appropriate succession, would furnish information analogous to the information imparted to a chess student by the statement of the
successive moves in those games of chess that one sees sometimes in books on chess
and in newspapers. Now if the film photographs were so arranged that the moves in
the approved solution of, say, problem 99 could be thrown on a screen, as slowly and
as quickly as desired, and if the film records of a few hundred such games could be
conveniently arranged, a very wide range of situations that would probably come up
in war would be portrayed; and the moves made in handling those situations would
form valuable precedents for action, whenever situations approximating them should
come up in war.24

Now, with the Internet, war games played anywhere, or online, can contribute to portraying a wide range of situations that probably would come up in the
event of war. Whereas Fiske proposed using photographs, the proposed approach
for developing and applying a theory of repeated games involves capturing, in
extensive form, “manual” and online operational games played either sequentially by one organization, along with their context; in different times and places
by various organizations; or many times online. In manual games (which may
employ computer calculation in adjudication and may be played online), players
must make decisions, either simultaneously or sequentially, during each of their
moves, taking into account what they know about the current situation; and procedures used to evaluate the consequences of the player’s decisions must be quite
clear to the players and simple enough for the players to understand.25
Presentation of game data in extensive and strategic forms (see next section)
allows a combination of game-theoretic and, for larger strategy spaces, complex
adaptive science techniques to analyze the games. Given that this approach
showed promise in analyzing the Halsey games, this type of analysis might
be successful.26 Tapping into games played anywhere but exploring the same
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol70/iss2/3
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contingency would increase the space of strategies evaluated beyond what one
team could do at an individual institution.
Useful Elements of Game Theory
Game theory “provides a language for the description of conscious, goal-oriented
decision making processes involving more than one individual.” It furnishes a
methodology to make amenable to analysis such subtle concepts as state of information, choice, move, strategy, outcome, and payoff.27
Games presented in extensive form as a “tree” illustrate these concepts most
clearly. Representing games in extensive form captures the timing of the players’
moves relative to relevant events and representations of what the players knew
about others’ choices when they selected their moves. Figure 1 illustrates two
simple, two-move games in extensive form involving players Red (R) and Blue
(B). The players make sequential moves in 1a, where Blue knows Red’s choice
when making its move, and “simultaneous” moves in 1b, where both sides select
their moves without knowing the other’s choice.28 For simplicity, these games
represent Red having three and Blue having two choices, one branch representing
each choice. A move involves selecting one of the possible choices—a COA. The
moves are numbered and the outcomes are indicated with subscripts that relate
to the players’ moves, e.g., Oij indicates the outcome should Red select COA i
and Blue select COA j. The payoffs to Red and Blue are indicated similarly by
Rij and Bij, respectively. The payoffs are the value (utility) of the outcome to each
player. Should the value of all outcomes be equal and opposite for Red and Blue
(i.e., Rij = –Bij for all Red COAs i and Blue COAs j), the game would be zero-sum.
Von Neumann and Morgenstern developed a method for expressing the utility of an outcome to an individual player as a specific quantity. However, this
FIGURE 1
GAMES IN EXTENSIVE (TREE) FORM
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method is difficult to employ and is made conceptually and practically much
more difficult when attempting to quantify a single utility for multiple players representing different organizations or groups of individuals. In general,
although some situations, such as winning or losing a duel, may be modeled
usefully as a zero-sum game, the more complex the description of the outcome,
the less valuable modeling the game as zero-sum is likely to be. Halsey game
summaries provide descriptions of the tactical outcomes resulting from player
moves and the operational outcome of the game, but the payoffs (i.e., the player’s
evaluation of the outcome and preferences among alternative outcomes) need to
be inferred from the descriptions.
Figure 1b also illustrates two ways to represent simultaneous moves and the
information available to players when they chose their next move. The bubble
(ellipse) around the positions at which Blue selects its move indicates that Blue
does not know which move Red has selected when it makes its choice. The lower
figure is an alternative representation of the same situation.
In a game with more than two players, the sequence of player choices and
moves is represented, adding to the detail above. Game controller and umpire
decisions are treated similarly to a player’s, representing their adjudications as
moves in the game.
If the focus of the analysis is on strategy and payoffs, representing a game
in strategic form may be more useful than the extensive form. A two-person
game in strategic form (also called the normal form) is represented as a twodimensional matrix. Each player represents a dimension, requiring games with
three players to be drawn as cubes; games with more than three players are even
more challenging to illustrate. Figure 2 illustrates the same games as in figure 1,
but in strategic form.
In shifting to the strategic from the extensive form, the move sequence and
information structure loses many details. However, the strategic form of these
simple games shows the importance of information (intelligence). Blue has many
more COAs available when acting with knowledge of Red’s COA than without
that knowledge.29 A strategy in game theory is complete description of the play,
accounting for all contingencies. Here the strategies, or COAs, available to Blue
going from the simultaneous to the sequential game go from selecting either
COA 1 or 2 to selecting among eight along the lines of (1,1);(2,1);(3,1), which
means Blue selects 1 if Red selects 1; Blue selects 1 if Red selects 2; Blue selects 1
if Red selects 3. Blue has one COA for all combinations of the three Red moves
and its two Blue moves. Although transitioning from a multimove game in
extensive form to one in strategic form boils down to a matter of careful bookkeeping, accounting for all combinations of possible COAs in games with many
moves is daunting.
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol70/iss2/3
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FIGURE 2
GAMES IN STRATEGIC FORM (MATRICES)

(1,1);(2,2);(3,1)

(1,2);(2,1);(3,2)

(R11,B11)

(R12,B12)

(R22,B22)

(R21,B21)

(R31,B31)

(R32,B32)

(1,2);(2,2);(3,2)

The strategic form is often easier to use than the extensive form for identifying equilibrium points and any absence of a pure strategy equilibrium point.30
Formally, an equilibrium point is “a vector of strategies such that no one player,
regarding the others as committed to their choices, can improve his lot.”31
The Halsey Games as a Case Study
The proposition presented at the beginning of this article was that capturing the
Halsey game moves in extensive form would provide a comprehensive way to
illustrate the decisions that Blue and Red commanders made in executing their
COAs so that others could see quickly what had been attempted and follow a
narrative of what worked for each side and what did not. This would allow those
others to benefit from the experience of the games. Also, the games in extensive
form would allow direct alignment and analysis of multiple games played over a
span of time.
Figure 3 diagrams Halsey game 15 in extensive form. The game begins with
Red and Blue deployments, followed by Red considering three choices and selecting one. The solid line represents the move; the dashed lines represent choices
not pursued. The numbering convention illustrates which team made the move,
the number of the game, and the date/time of the move. The game involved Red,
Blue, Green, and White, representing different countries. One of the Red choices
not selected in game 15 became the Red move in game 16, which allows adding game 16 to the game tree for analysis (while complicating the illustration).
Following Red’s initial move, Red and Blue, followed by Blue and Green, made
subsequent moves without any intelligence updates to the various role players
on those teams, creating effectively simultaneous moves. Then the umpire and
control team adjudicated a tactical outcome on the basis of the role player moves.
The focus of the Halsey games is on move assessments and the exploration of
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2017
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FIGURE 3
HALSEY GAME 15 IN EXTENSIVE FORM

alternatives. The “meat” of the games is in the deliberation of alternatives.32 The
game continued to a culminating point for the purposes of that game.33 In this
way, the moves and outcomes for a play of a game representing one Red campaign
approach may be captured.
Figure 4 illustrates the set of Halsey games at an operational level. Campaignlevel games began with game 10. In these games, Blue knew Red’s strategic concept, though not the tactical details. Blue then gamed one of its principal strategic
concepts against Red’s, using variations over several games, as Red also varied the
details of its strategic concept on the basis of what had been learned in previous
games.34 The variations did not affect the overall operational outcome resulting
from the pair of strategic concepts, which suggests that the governing factors
identified in the games are robust across the variations in the specific COAs
considered. (Although Green also made moves in the games, they did not affect
the game outcomes significantly beyond the initial game conditions, so are not
represented in the diagram.)
Games 10–14 explored Red pursuing one campaign strategic concept, games
15–17 explored another Red campaign strategic concept, and game 19 explored
a third. (Game 18 explored a completely different contingency involving Red
attacking a different opponent.) The U.S. IC provided the initial Red strategic,
operational, and tactical concepts. The Halsey teams then refined these estimates
as they enhanced the effectiveness of Red approaches against Blue and Green.
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol70/iss2/3
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FIGURE 4
HALSEY OPERATIONAL-LEVEL GAME TREE

Blue responded with various COAs to each Red approach. The figure illustrates
that Blue strategic concept 1 provided the best operational outcome against Red
strategic concept 1, Blue strategic concept 2 provided the best operational outcome against Red strategic concept 2, and Blue strategic concept 3 (combining
several possible Blue COAs) provided the best operational outcome against Red
strategic concept 3, of those examined. Red and Blue “other” provide place marks
for concepts not yet examined in the Halsey series as of the date the analysis was
conducted. The diagram provides a concise chart for an extended narrative on
the play and outcomes. It illustrates how the games proceeded over time, with
games 10–14 at the top, games 15–17 in the middle, and game 19 at the bottom.
The first game of a new COA spent significant time exploring the motivations
and timing of the players’ moves for establishing the initial conditions.35 Figure
5 depicts a typical set of decisions that Blue and Green would address in each of
these games.
Each game began with Green and Blue either observing Red posture or receiving a démarche. Green then had to decide whether to capitulate or resist, and, if
choosing to resist, whether to preempt Red on warning or to defend following a
Red attack. Blue then had to choose whether to wait or come to Green’s support
immediately. Although the Halsey team explored some branches of the tree in
figure 5, for the purposes of the study Green always chose to resist and defend,
and Blue to support Green. This is a type of subgame for which a rich gametheoretic literature exists, and one example of where existing game-theoretic
work could be used to inform the gaming.36
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FIGURE 5
BLUE-GREEN INITIAL SUBGAME

Gaming often is criticized for a lack of rigor and a limited ability to accumulate knowledge. A standard for rigor is whether another group could replay the
game, recognizing that different player or umpire/control adjudication, including
chance moves, will dictate different tactical outcomes, some of which may affect
the operational outcome. The Halsey games demonstrate that, with appropriate
documentation, games conducted by one organization sequentially, or by many
organizations in different times and places, can be arranged to provide a detailed
understanding of sets of feasible and acceptable tactical and operational COAs
from Red’s perspective, and feasible and acceptable Blue COAs for each Red
approach.37
The Halsey games demonstrated that standardized game documentation
should include the following:
• Player moves, adjudication, and tactical outcomes using a consistent indexing system that identifies player, game, and time references.
• Blue should use appropriate portions of joint operations planning procedures, and other teams should use their best understanding of adversary/
allied planning procedures. Benefits of using operations planning procedures include both educating officers in writing orders and improving the
use of gaming in analyzing courses of action. Using the planning procedures of adversaries/allies highlights the state of understanding about how
they approach the situation under study. The war-gaming “process highlights tasks that appear to be particularly important to the operation and
provides a degree of familiarity with operational-level possibilities that
might otherwise be difficult to achieve.”38 Educating officers in writing
orders was a key benefit of German war gaming between the world wars.39
• The mission analysis should document COAs considered but not played.
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol70/iss2/3
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• The geographic displays and synchronization matrices used in the games
for decision making help communicate the concept of operations rapidly
and should be part of the move documentation.
• Control logs should document the tactical outcomes from each individual
adjudication made, providing the “true” state of the world as a consequence of the adjudication.
• The tactical outcomes (intelligence updates) provided to each side, to clarify
the information conditions.
• The control team should consider carefully the trade-off between open
information and contingency planning. As Quade notes (from RAND’s
experience in its SIERRA Project of gaming, which had many features
in common with the Halsey Alfa games), having less information about
adversary moves encourages contingency planning.40
• Routinely documenting the alternative branch points—the COAs—
considered would suggest alternatives for future games, better support
meshing operational games as they are played, and provide information
needed for more in-depth, formal analysis of the games.
• Documentation of any paths that were replayed, if that occurred during the game.
Relevant combatant commanders have sought the results of the Halsey games
to inform their planning, and the Halsey team has proposed a set of low-cost
measures to enhance fleet capabilities to the Navy staff, some of which are being
adopted now.
Extending the Approach to Online Gaming
Conceptually, it is also possible to capture online games in extensive form by capturing the moves of each player in the game electronically, potentially expanding
the COAs examined as more players play the game more frequently. This might
allow the identification of equilibriums and dominant strategies that prevail
against all adversary COAs.41 Whereas manual war games such as Halsey involve
a mix of free-form and semirigid adjudication (using some standard calculations), online games use rigid adjudication, dictating an outcome for each interaction as it occurs. Games such as Fleet Command allow command organizations
and involve adjudicating multiple tactical interactions in a game that approaches
the operational level of war.
Online games usually specify the mission or provide a choice of missions.
Player setup of the scenarios in such games provides much of the information
(e.g., friendly and enemy forces) contained in mission analyses and operations
orders. However, the commander’s intent and concept of operations may be less
clear in online gaming.
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2017
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This raises the issue of act and action meaning.
[T]he data for behavioral science are not sheer movements, but actions—that is, acts
performed in a perspective which gives them meaning and purpose. Plainly, it is of
crucial importance that we distinguish between the meaning of the act to the actor
(or to other people, including ourselves, reacting with him) and its meaning to us as
scientists, taking the action as a subject-matter. I call these, respectively, act meaning
and action meaning. . . . The behavioral scientist must first arrive at an act meaning,
that is, construe what conduct a particular piece of behavior represents; and then he
must search for the meaning of the interpreted action, its interconnections with other
actions or circumstances.42

In online gaming, capturing a move, such as one unit engaging another, represents an act meaning and is conceptually easy. However, without clear statements
of the commander’s intent and concept of operations, the action meaning must
be inferred.
If the objective of an analysis is merely to assess which COAs provide better
combat outcomes, the act meaning may be sufficient, given a very large number
of COAs being explored. No matter the intent, the moves that provide better outcomes may be clear. Current large-scale, computer-based campaign analyses use
this approach. However, if the game involves any forms of signaling, deterrence,
or uses of force for influence rather than simply defeating enemy forces, capturing the action meaning is essential.
Employing Game-Theoretic and Complex Systems Analyses
Since translating games in extensive form into games in strategic form is a matter of detailed bookkeeping, once games are captured in extensive form, creating
computer programs to represent them in strategic form is feasible. Once the
games are represented in strategic form, finding dominant strategies and equilibriums is conceptually straightforward. With close attention to information
conditions, these data also could support more-sophisticated game-theoretic
solution concepts.
The major complication is in evaluating payoffs, using the description of outcomes. Where those contemplating an operation can review and rank outcomes
quickly from a limited number of player-strategy pairings (or vectors, for more
than two players), doing so for a large number of outcomes created by online
gaming would require scoring criteria. Conceptually, the subjective judgment
involved in selecting scoring criteria is little different from that employed in
quantitative adjudication. Different participants will have different ideas about
the value of a specific outcome, depending on their sophistication and ability to
think through actions beyond the time frame and scope of the game. The commander’s intent should provide the basis for evaluating outcomes, although this
too should be evaluated for how the intent supports national security aims. For
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol70/iss2/3
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FIGURE 6
FITNESS LANDSCAPES
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the process to be objective, the adjudication and scoring should be apparent to
the players and analysts involved and allow for reclama and adjustment, if disagreements occur.
Beyond game-theoretic solution concepts, these data may be used to develop
fitness landscapes in which the height of a point on the landscape represents the
value of the courses of action.43 The outcomes of a two-person, zero-sum game
(where the value to one player is the negative of the value to the opponent) may
be envisioned as a mountain range where the height of each mountain is the
value resulting from the outcome of paired courses of action of the players. A
player trying to minimize the maximum is akin to someone looking for the lowest passage through the mountain range. This analogy suggests a way to capture,
depict, and analyze the implication of the values to each player of a set of actions
(moves). Figure 6 depicts fitness landscapes for what payoffs might be involved
in a two-person, zero-sum game and the payoffs to two players in a multiplemove, non-zero-sum game, showing the payoffs over time for the COAs each
side selects on each move.
The intuition is that, just as armies in Europe used the same routes over the
centuries on physical landscapes to attack and retreat, fitness landscapes may anticipate logical paths that a conflict could follow. The analogy of physical terrain
to fitness landscapes could be particularly useful in understanding cyber operations, leading to traditional mission, enemy, troops, terrain, timing, and civilian
effect analysis (referred to as METT-TC) in what is otherwise a conceptually
challenging space to depict. More broadly, fitness landscapes may allow application of developments in complexity sciences.
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IF YOU’RE SUCCESSFUL, WHAT DIFFERENCE WILL IT MAKE?
WHAT IMPACT WILL SUCCESS HAVE? HOW WILL IT BE
MEASURED?
The first level of success would be to involve a much broader range of national
security professionals, particularly members of the military, in synthetic experiences that would inform their preparations for operations, both in operational
planning and force allocation and development. The second level of success
would be to provide decision makers with deeper and more-accurate appreciations of the challenges and opportunities at hand, resulting in wiser policies and
strategies. The third level of success would be a phase change in DoD’s and the
IC’s analytical cultures, weaning them off methods and tools inappropriate for
the complexity of the age.
The thresholds for the first level of success would be the extent of adoption of
the manual operational gaming process by military colleges, then by the broader
officer corps, and then by the Pentagon for force-development analysis. The
threshold for the second level would be the time that senior decision makers devote to gaining synthetic experience, rather than taking briefs, and the effects of
this on security and defense policy and strategy. The threshold for the third level
would be the extent to which this approach replaces the reliance on inappropriate
computer combat and campaign models in DoD and supplements international
relations / political science techniques in the IC. Using operational gaming, in
conjunction with fleet/field exercises and complementary forms of analyses, we
would not expect to create Hari Seldon’s psychohistory (from Isaac Asimov’s
Foundation series), but would expect to take significant steps in understanding
many of the factors that govern the logic of competition and cooperation.
WHAT ARE THE RISKS AND THE PAYOFFS?
The proposed approach requires multidisciplinary teams, involves both technical
and methodological challenges, and faces headwinds from the current culture of
and incentives enjoyed by the military modeling and simulation community and
industry. Adoption of the approach would require military and commercial gamers to work with game theorists and scholars of complex adaptive systems—each
of whom is not fully familiar with the others’ disciplines. Currently, need-to-know
and proprietary restrictions bar the sharing of detailed game data within DoD
and the IC.44 This prevents accumulation of knowledge from games within these
communities except in superficial ways. The first experiment with representing
the Halsey set of games as a game in extensive form demonstrated challenges in
representing actions at different echelons of command as game moves and attaching values to the outcomes.45 Capturing moves and outcomes from online games
is apparently unprecedented (although commercial games are tuned routinely as
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol70/iss2/3
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players discover dominant strategies).46 Analysis of fitness landscapes is at the
early stage of development and has relatively few practitioners.
Employing institutions that are dedicated to education and research and have
long experience in manual and online war gaming (such as the military colleges)
and complexity sciences (such as the New England Complex Systems Institute)
would mitigate the risks of experimenting and demonstrating the conceptual approach.47 In March 2016, the Chief of Naval Operations and the Commandant
of the Marine Corps established a virtual community of practice, or vCOP, for a
limited group of sailors, Marines, and civilians with an interest in war gaming and
provided funding to the Naval War College to provide web-based war-gaming/
experimentation repositories.48 This effort could serve to share the data needed
to construct and analyze games in extensive form.
The major obstacle is the analytical culture in DoD and the IC, as amplified
by the large contract base employed in conducting analyses for these communities. The major payoff would lie in changing this culture and producing moreinsightful analysis that affects senior policy-maker and military decisions more
frequently. Hopefully, part of DoD’s reinvigoration of gaming will result in senior
officials taking the time to participate in games rather than just receiving briefings on them.
HOW MUCH WILL IT COST?
The answer depends on the scale of the effort. The principal costs are in creating
interdisciplinary teams, some of whose members may be part-time consultants.
A team should consist of leads from military planning and gaming, a lead who
has experience working with the commercial gaming industry, a game theorist,
and a complex adaptive systems lead with experience in fitness landscapes. Consultants should include those familiar with combat/campaign models, statistics,
behavioral economics, history, and political science (preferably with experience
in agent-based models). Software licenses likely would be required for commercial gaming technology. Establishing standards and training war-gamers for data
collection would entail additional costs. Several million dollars per year should
be sufficient to develop the practice and exploitation of repeated gaming.
HOW LONG WILL IT TAKE?
This program should use rapid spiral development. Four years should be sufficient to make or break the concept, although early failures can be anticipated.
The aim for the first year should be to establish game documentation and sharing standards, while using commercial games to demonstrate the techniques
required for online gaming. Military college and other DoD/IC game data
should be available in the second year to learn what works and to transition the
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theoretical approach into early practice. A focus on cyber warfare, with the aim
of developing and analyzing cyber fitness landscapes, would test the limits of the
concept.
WHAT ARE THE MIDTERM AND FINAL “EXAMS” TO CHECK FOR
SUCCESS? HOW WILL PROGRESS BE MEASURED?
Early elements required for success are the ability to document and share manual
games, and to track online game moves and outcomes and represent them as
games in extensive and strategic forms and as fitness landscapes. The next exam
would be the ability to derive the logic of the competition from game-theoretic
analyses and these landscapes. Then the measures of adoption discussed above
will come into play.
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